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In a recent work, William Courtenay refers to the issues
in Holcot's writings under discussion in this essay as "theological
sophismata."1 That they are. But it is the burden of this essay to suggest
that they are more: Holcot's interest in these questions had a funda-
mentally practical import, and such seemingly esoteric philosophical
and theological speculation was in the service of a pastoral program
geared to preaching the faith to unbelievers. For someone in a religious
order charged with this mission, questions that may initially appear
only as sophismata may actually perform quite different functions
when examined in context.
Robert Holcot was best known in his own time as a comment
tator on the Book of Wisdom. Wey writes that this work "made
its author famous overnight and his fame held throughout the next
two centuries."2 Wey also proposes that it was because of the rep-
utation won with the Wisdom-commentary that Holcot's Sentences-
commentary and some quodlibet questions were printed four times
1. William]. Courtenay, Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth Century England (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 303.
2. Joseph C. Wey, "The Sermo Finalis of Robert Holcot," Medieval Studies 11
(1949): 219-224, at p. 219.
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between 1497 and 1518. His thought was also deemed important
enough to be discussed and compared with that of Scotus and Ockham
in a work by Jacques Almain printed in 1526. But sometime after this
Holcot seems to have been relegated to the margins of the story of
medieval thought. In 1958, Muckle spoke of what he thought an
"increasing interest in Holcot."3 But by 1962 it seems that Johannes
Beumer was still right to affirm that "strikingly little has been done
on Holcot-"^ Though many hopeful signs have appeared in the thirty-
two years since that remark,5 there remains a dearth of writings on
Holcot in English—a shame, since he is one the English ought to be
proud to claim as their own.6
Perhaps earlier characterizations of Holcot's work as "Γoccamisme
renforce"7 have adversely affected the scholarly attention devoted to it
(attention would naturally be drawn to the more original of the pair).
Furthermore, in a rather famous (though now somewhat dated) essay
of fifty years ago, Konstanty Michalski wrote that Holcot is nearest to
Ockham of all the English nominalists by the fact that at every instant
the former sought to disengage the verities of faith from philosophical
3. J. T. Muckle, " 'Όtrum Theobgia Sit Scientia': A Quodlibet Question of Robert
Holcot O.P.," Medieval Studies 20 (1958): 127-153, at p. 127.
4. Johannes Beumer, "Zwang und Freiheit in der Glaubenszustimmung nach
Robert Holkot," Scholastik 37 (1962): 514-529, at p. 514.
5. There is a valuable review of the recent literature in Hester Gelber, Exploring the
Boundaries of Reason: Three Questions on the Nature of God by Robert Holcot, O.P.,
Studies and Texts 62 (Toronto: PIMS, 1983), pp. 1-28. See also the very helpful
introduction in the forthcoming volume of some of Holcot's quodlibets edited by
Paul Streveler and Katherine Tachau.
6. In addition to his many and varied writings, there seems to be much about
Holcot's life that makes him an extremely interesting—perhaps even edifying—figure
on the medieval stage. According to Beryl Smalley, "No medieval moralist, and it
is a large claim, ever had a stronger sense of humour." See her "Robert Holcot
O.P.," Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum 26 (1956): 5-97, at p. 5. After Holcot, writes
Smalley, "The future of theology in England lay with grimmer, narrower men" (p. 97).
Finally, Holcot died in the Black Death while serving others. The DTC reports,
"Holcot mourut a Northampton, en 1329, victime de sa charite, en soignant les
pestiferes, au cours du fleau qui, a cette epoque, ravagea ΓAngleterre" (7.1:30).
7. A. B. Emden explains that many of Holcot's positions have been described
in this way. See his A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), 2: 946. Emden adds that Holcot himself never felt
that his views became incompatible with Thomism.
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argumentation.8 While there are several striking similarities between
Ockham and Holcot, many contemporary scholars retreat from such
strong claims of similarity-9 Coming out from Ockham's shadow may
account for Holcot's increasing popularity among this generation of
scholars. Certainly, there was and is much that commends Holcot as a
fascinating figure in his own right. Though Holcot surely breathed the
air of the fourteenth century, the winds of Thomism were still very
much at his back—more so than for many other notable fourteenth-
century figures, because he was himself a member of the Order of
Preachers. As such, Holcot's audience, Holcot's purposes in writing,
Holcot's theology may be more distinctive than has traditionally
been acknowledged. Looking at these questions in this way may also
more clearly circumscribe the relation Holcot saw between faith and
philosophy and thereby reveal him in a clearer and more distinct light.
In the first part of my remarks, I shall try to lay out how Holcot
addressed the issues of prophecy, the contingency of revelation, and
the freedom of God. I will also try to show what he considered at stake
in their relationship. Both the freedom of the divine will and the
freedom of the human will seem alternately imperiled depending on
the sense one makes of prophecy and the contingency of revelation.
(Obviously, Holcot was far from alone among his contemporaries in
fourteenth-century Oxford in being concerned with such matters.)10
The second part of the essay will be briefer and more speculative.
8. Konstanty Michalski, "Le probleme de la volonte a Oxford et a Paris au XIV
siecle," Studia Philosophical Commentarii Societatis Phϊlosophicae Pohnorum 2 (1937):
233-365, at p. 303.
9. For example, Courtenay states that "the parallels between Ockham and Holcot
are too few to allow us to apply the label Όckhamist' to Holcot" (Schools and
Scholars, p. 217). It is the case, of course, that Holcot's views on prophecy and
God's revelation of future contingents bear many similarities to those advanced by
William Ockham. For an account of the latter's positions, see Calvin Normore and
Aron Edidin, Όackham [sic] on Prophecy," International Journal for the Philosophy of
Religion 13 (1982): 179-189. See also Normore, "Future Contingencies," in CHLMP,
pp. 358-382.
10. A concern with prophecy and God's intentions for the future was understand-
able in a century ravaged by the Hundred Years' War, the Babylonian Captivity of
the papacy, and the Black Plague. Thus Holcot frequently laments with some justice
"these modern times." On this complaint, see Heiko Oberman, Forerunners of the
Reformation (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), p. 133.
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Holcot's literary corpus is made up of at least two kinds of writings:
those in the usual academic genres (Sentences-commentary, quodli-
betal questions, and so on) and some rather decidedly pastoral treatises
dedicated to the training of preachers and the cultivation of piety.
I conclude by offering an hypothesis about how to fit these two
genres together. I want to suggest that the 'philosophical' Holcot of
the Sentences-commentary and quodlibets and the more pious Holcot
of the Wisdom-commentary and pastorally oriented moral writings
are quite complementary. Indeed, they are so complementary that
to attempt to focus on either apart from the other or to try to
separate philosophical from theological agendas results, I think, in
an incomplete picture of him.
THE CONTINGENCY OF PROPHECY
AND REVELATION
At one point in his Sentences-commentary, Holcot gives
the following definition of prophecy and states the implication it
carries:
prophecy is divine inspiration announcing the outcomes of things with
immutable truth. Therefore, if something is prophesied to happen in the
future, it will immutably be in the future, and moreover: it will necessarily
happen in the future.11
Suppose that revelation were only contingent, however. According
to Holcot, it would seem that if events revealed by prophets were
not necessarily true—that is, if it were possible for them not to
happen at some future time—then it would be neither obligatory nor
appropriate to believe prophecy. Neither would the prophecy of the
above definition even be possible. If such revelation were contingent,
11. "[P]rophetia est divina inspiratio rerum eventus immobili veritate denuntians.
Ergo, si aliquid est prophetatum esse futurum, illud immobiliter erit futurum, et ultra:
necessario erit futurum." I would like thank Paul Streveler, West Chester University,
for his generosity in making available to me much of what he and his colleagues
will publish in the critical edition of portions of Holcot's Sentences-commentary and
quodlibets. In references to Holcot's in quatuor libros sententiarum quaestiσnes, I shall
cite the page number of the typescript of this edition. This description of prophecy
is found there on pp. 8-9 (2.2). All translations from the Latin are my own.
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no one would be obliged to believe the prophets because the opposite
of their promises could be true. It would follow, Holcot concludes,
that the Jews were not obligated to believe the prophecies of Christ-
In addition, consider Jesus' statement to Peter that Peter would thrice
deny him. If Christ's statement were only contingently true, it seems
that it was within the power of Peter to bring it about that Christ
had asserted a false thing. If this were true, then Holcot says it was
also in the power of the people with Peter at the time, because they
could have killed him any time after Christ's prediction and before
Peter's third denial
The ramifications of the contingency of revelation become much
more weighty when we consider things concerning future blessedness
or fulfillment pledged and sworn to by God through Christ—say,
the general resurrection of the dead. It would seem that God could
certify nothing conclusively of any future occurrence inasmuch as it
would always be contingently future. In short, if the revealed promises
in Holy Writ were extended only contingently, they must then be
dependent on future happenings. They could then be false, inasmuch
as something contingent can not be. But if Scripture can be false,
then those who think belief in the words of Scripture efficacious for
salvation might be able to merit through false faith. And if God is
able to reveal future contingents that remain contingent after their
revelation, then—Holcot's example—a Sadducee who has presumably
been justly damned for a thousand years for not believing the promises
of Scripture is now able never to have been justly damned if those
promises turn out to be false. Hence it is possible that this man never
believed incorrectly and so was damned without cause.
Significant christological issues also arise here. Holcot readily ad-
mits that if Christ said there would be a resurrection and there
isn't one (which would be possible given the contingency of the
event prophesied), it is impossible to deny that the saying of Christ
was false.12 Therefore, Christ said a false thing either knowingly or
12. Holcot, Quodlϊbet 3 8, line 472: "igitur impossible est vitare quin dictum
Christi fuit falsum." This quodlibet, entitled "Utrum generalis resurrectio necessario
sit futura," will be cited hereafter by line number with the abbreviated title Utrum gen-
eralis resuπectio. For a list of Holcot's quodlibets, see Palemon Glorieux, La littέrature
quodlibέtique (Paris: ]. Vrin, 1936), 2:258-261. For textual issues relating to the extant
manuscripts of Holcot's quodlibets, see Gelber, Boundaries of Reason.
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ignorantly. If knowingly, Christ lied. If ignorantly, he was deceived.13
Neither alternative seemed to Holcot particularly palatable.
Holcot cites numerous authorities against Christ being made un-
faithful to his promises: (1)2 Timothy 2:13 reads, "He remains faith-
ful; he is not able to deny himself." The gloss Holcot appeals to
elaborates, "He who is truth 'is not able to deny himself, which he
would do if he did not fulfill his words." (2) If Christ were able
to have been deceived or to have deceived others, it would follow,
according to St. Augustine,14 that Christ is not the truth. (3) In Luke
24:44, Christ states that it is necessary that all things about him be
fulfilled. (4) Finally, the gloss on Matthew 28:6 ("he rose just as he
said") reads, "thus it is impossible that what he said not be done."15
If Christ prophesied a future resurrection, it is necessary that it be
fulfilled. Consequently, revelation must not remain contingent after
it is given.
Suppose then that revelation and prophecy were necessary. Holcot
finds at least two difficulties with the supposition. First, God's freedom
and power would be very much restricted if God were not now
able to falsify propositions God has revealed in the past. Second, if
revelation does not remain contingent, then human free will would be
taken away regarding those things prophesied of future human actions.
Note that the issue of prophecy is even more insidious than whether
human freedom survives God's knowledge of future contingents, for
it is at least possible for the latter question to attempt to rescue
human freedom by appealing to God's eternal perspective to remove
divine knowledge from the temporal order. That way seems closed to
resolving the difficulty with prophecy, for we are here dealing with
datable, historical utterances firmly embedded in the temporal order
that nonetheless claim to 'announce [future] events by immutable
truth.' If the promises of revelation necessarily eventuate, God as it
were puts down stakes at one point in time on an event that has to
happen later. God is not somehow outside time seeing events 'as they
happen' in an eternal present. Rather, the word of God is inserted
into time with reference to an event that from one significant frame
of reference both has yet to be and must be a certain way.
13. Utrum generalis resuπectio, Streveler lines 494-498.
14. 83 Questions 14: "Si Christus fefellit, veritas non est."
15. Biblia sacra cum glossa interHneari, ordinaria . . . (Venice, 1588), 5:87Γ: "sic
impossible est non fieri quod dixit."
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In sum, Holcot writes,
if the opposite of what was revealed is able to happen, God is able to
deceive, lie, perjure, not to fulfill what he promises, and to be unfaithful,
and so on; which seem to oppose good morals. On the other hand, if we
say that the opposite of what has been revealed, or promised, or asserted,
or sworn by God is not able to happen, it seems to impair the divine
power, which in no way is diminished through revelation, or an oath,
or a promise made to a creature. Moreover, it seems to impugn human
liberty: because after a revelation is made of something falling under the
free faculty of the will, it would now make it necessary if the opposite
could not happen.16
It seems, therefore, that though we may want to affirm both the
infallibility of divine prophecy (to preserve the veracity of God and
Scripture) and the contingency of the events prophesied (to safeguard
God's power and human freedom), we cannot hold to either without
being impaled on the opposite horn of a dilemma. If we wish to
maintain the necessity of revelation, we seem to surrender human
freedom and God's power to do other than God promised. If we affirm
the contingency of God's revelation, we challenge God's truthfulness
and the veracity of Scripture. I turn now to Holcot's attempt to slip
between these horns.
Holcot first seeks to determine whether God has an obligation
to fulfill revelation. His answer to this will eventually be negative,
but let us first examine the case he makes for such an obligation.
In his quodlibet question, "Utrum generalis resurrectio necessario sit
future," Holcot proposes an unpleasant dilemma for those who would
affirm that revelation is only contingently true (that is, that God does
not necessarily fulfill what God promises). Either for God not to do
what God promises is unsuitable for God or it is not. If it is, then
16. Holcot Quodlibet 3 3 (Streveler lines 35-44): "[S]i dixerimus quod oppositum
revelati potest contingere, quod Deus potest decipere, mentiri, periurare, non solvere
quod promisit, et fieri infidelis, et huiusmodo, quae bonis moribus repugnare videntur.
Ex alia parte, si dixerimus quod oppositum revelati, vel promissi, vel asserti seu
iurati a Deo non potest evenire, videtur derogare divinae potentiae, quo in nullo
minuitur propter revelationem, vel iuramentum, vel promissionem factam creaturae.
Item, videtur derogare humanae libertati: quia facta revelatione de aliquo cadente
sub libera facultate voluntatis, iam fieret necessarium si eius oppositum evenire non
posset." This question, entitled "Utrum, facta revelatione alicuius futuri contingentis,
ipsum maneat contingens post revelationem," will hereafter be cited by line number
under the abbreviated title Utrum facta revelatione.
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there is something unsuitable in God, which is, according to Anselm,
impossible. Therefore, it is impossible for God not to fulfill what God
promises; and so God necessarily does what God promises. But if it
is not unsuitable for God not to do what God promises, it seems to
follow that it is not unsuitable for God either to be false (if God
decides not to fulfill what God promises) or to be impotent (if God is
unable to fulfill what God promises). Therefore, God's promises could
be in vain, and prophecy could be in vain.
In both cases, we seem at first sight to be driven back to the
conclusion that it is necessary for God to fulfill what God promises.
If God necessarily fulfills what God promises, we are still faced with
the problem of what this inability to be false entails for God's power.
No imperfection is able to be in God. It would entail such an imper-
fection, says Holcot, if God were not able to assert something false
knowingly.17 Certain creatures (like demons) deserve to be deceived
by God. Furthermore, God ordered the sons of Israel to deceive the
Egyptians. Similarly, Christ willed to be born of a virgin to deceive
the devil. Rebecca and Jacob deceived Isaac; and Judith, Holofernes.
So Holcot concludes that he sees no unsuitability in saying that God
speaks falsely in the sense that God says God will do something and
then God does not do it.18
Holcot explains that 'to deceive' is accepted among the doctors of
the Church in different senses. It can mean nothing more, strictly
speaking, than voluntarily to cause an error in someone so that he
affirms as true what is in fact false. On the other hand, 'to deceive' can
be understood more unsuitably as importing notions of wickedness,
evil, and maliciousness. Holcot concludes that God can deceive by
making someone believe a false thing, but not by being malicious.19
In addition to these scriptural examples of God's acts of deception,
Holcot makes a more general point concerning God's independence
from creation. He says that since no goodness can be added to God
from any operation on a creature, God is not better when God acts
justly and fulfills God's promises than when God does nothing at
17. Sentences, Streveler p. 97: "immo imperfectionis esset si non posset hoc
intendere."
18. Sentences, Streveler pp. 97-98.
19. Utrum generaUs resuπectio, Streveler lines 419-420: "Primo modo concedes
dum est quod Deus potest fallere: secundo modo non potest."
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all. To preserve the divine impassibility, Holcot needs to affirm that
nothing pertaining to the essential goodness of God depends on a
creature. To affirm otherwise is extremely absurd ("nimis absurdum").
God could even destroy every creature whatsoever without diminish^
ing God's goodness. Consequently,
if God abrogated all his statutes and made it that they never were statutes
and did nothing of his promises, he would not be less good than he was
before the creation of the world, when there was nothing except himself.20
Indeed, God's causality causes everything in the universe to subsist.
As Holcot says, God is not like the builder of a building who can
walk away from his work without its crumbling to the ground. If God
ever withdrew God's control from the world, it would be destroyed
in the blink of an eye ("ictu oculi").21 God's ability to annihilate the
world and all its creatures is something to which Holcot frequently
appeals. It seems to serve as the ultimate guarantee of the contingency
of revelation, because it is the ultimate guarantee of the contingency
of everything—including events that have been prophesied to occur
in the future. So he writes,
God is able to annihilate all the angels and everything else. . . . But
he is not any more necessitated to restore these things than he was
necessitated in the beginning to produce them. But without souls and
bodies a resurrection is not able to be made: therefore, it is not absolutely
necessary that there be a resurrection.22
If it is not necessary that there be a resurrection, it is not necessary
that prophecies about one come true. The contingency of revelation
follows naturally from the contingency of all things. But just as there
is no inference from 'God killed the innocent' to 'God sins', so there
is none from 'God does not do what he swore he would do' to 'God
20. Utrum generalis resurrectio, Streveler lines 292-294: "[S]i Deus omnia statuta
sua abrogaret et faceret quo numquam fuissent statuta et nihil faceret de promissis,
non minus bonus foret quam fuit ante mundi constitutionem, quando nihil fuit nisi
ipse."
21. Utrum generalis resuπectio, Streveler lines 272-278.
22. Utrum generalis resuπecύo, Streveler lines 224-228: "Deus potest adnihilare
omnes angelos et omne aliud.. . . Sed non necessitatur ad ea reparandum plusquam
necessitabatur in principio ad ea producendum. Sed sine animabus et corporibus non
potest resurrectio fieri; igitur non est absolute necessarium quo fiat resurrectio."
174 JOSEPH M. INCANDELA
is perjurious'. Holcot reasons that the term 'perjurious' implies that
God ought to do otherwise than God does out of respect for some
law to which God is subjected and, consequently, upon which God's
goodness depends. This would imply that God is obligated to serve this
law or lose moral goodness. This is impossible according to Holcot.
God's sovereign freedom grounds the contingency of revelation. In
his quodlibets, Holcot adduces five proofs from Duns Scotus and
eight from Thomas Aquinas to make the point that God acts freely
and of God's own will. If the general resurrection were not freely
and contingently done by God, Holcot argues, then God would be
necessitated to do something outside of God's self.23 God's power
knows no such constraints. Therefore, the consequent of the above
conditional must be false. By modus tollens, the general resurrection is
freely and contingently done by God.
Holcot goes on to explain that if everything were necessary after
it had been revealed, it would follow that God is not able to reveal a
proposition such as, 'Socrates will contingently sin tomorrow'. For this
to be necessary would be to reveal that something presumably coming
under the free faculty of Socrates' will (namely, the ability to sin or
not) is not able not to happen. So if he will not sin contingently and
he does sin, then he sins necessarily. He is thus not able to avoid his
sin and so cannot be held accountable for his action. If so, thought
Holcot, he would not sin at all. Consequently, it must be the case that
'Socrates will sin' remains contingent after its revelation. To assume
otherwise leads to a contradiction.
Just asserting the contingency of revelation, however, does not
solve all our problems. It may in fact create more. Consider divine
immutability, for instance. If God is able not to fulfill God's revealed
word, then it would seem that God is able to change; for God can
decide not to keep a promise God had previously planned to keep.
Holcot certainly doesn't want to surrender God's immutability. Then
doesn't this point undo all previous attempts to secure the conthv
gency of revelation and inevitably lead us back to the conclusion
that God necessarily fulfills what God reveals?
No, because something is contingently true, according to Hol-
cot, which is true but able never to have been true ("hoc est esse
23. Utrum genercdis resuπectio, Streveler lines 220-223: "Deus necessitaretur ad
agendum aliud extra se."
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contingenter verum, videlicit, esse verum et posse numquam fuisse
verum").24 If it turns out that there never is a resurrection, it is not
as though God suddenly changed God's mind and, consequently, that
the truth value of 'There will be a resurrection' changed from true
to false. Rather, it was false from eternity. This does not entail that
it was necessarily false. It was able to have been true from eternity,
whence its contingency. If there is a resurrection, then the statement
was true from eternity. So Holcot says that God knew that God would
voluntarily and freely ("voluntarie et libere") produce the world, but
God never began to know this. God knew this from eternity ("sed
hoc numquam incepit scire, ergo ab eterno scivit se producturum
mundum"25). Therefore, God's actions are not necessary and God's
will is not mutable in the face of this contingency. Holcot relates
with approval the following from Peter Lombard, Sentences 1.43.11:
"God," [the Lombard] began, "is able to do other than he does, and
nevertheless, if he does otherwise, he would not be different. And he is
able to will other than he wills; and nevertheless his will is able to be
neither other, nor new, nor mutable in any way. For if he is able to will
what he never willed, neither nevertheless newly nor by a new will, but
only eternally is he able to will. For he is able to will what from eternity
he was able to have willed." Therefore, it is plain according to the Teacher
that this conditional is not valid: "He is able to will the opposite of that
which he now wills; therefore his will is mutable," because he is able
never to have willed that which he now wills, just as he is able never to
have willed that Peter is predestined.26
What is even more significant from the perspective of a preacher,
if revelation is contingent, Scripture can be false and with it the
whole faith. All medieval Christian writers presupposed the veracity
24. Utrum generalis resuπectio, Streveler lines 388-389.
25. Sentences, Streveler p. 17.
26. Utrum generalis resurrectio, Streveler lines 657-666: "'Potest,' inquit, 'Deus
aliud facere quam facit; et tamen, si aliud faceret, non alius ipse esset. Et potest aliud
velle quam vult; et tamen eius voluntas nee alia, nee nova, nee mutabilis aliquo
modo esse potest. Et si enim potest velle quod numquam voluit, nee tamen noviter
nee nova voluntate, sed sempiterna tantum velle potest. Potest enim velle quod ab
aeterno potuit voluisse.' Igitur, patet secundum Magistrum quo ista consequentia non
valet: 'potest velle oppositum illius quod nunc vult; igitur voluntas eius est mutabilis,'
quia potest numquam voluisse illus quod modo vult, sicut potest numquam voluisse
Petrum esse praedestinatum."
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of Scripture. If revelation could be false, however, everything was at
stake. In one pithy remark in the Sentences-commentary, Holcot lays
out the far-reaching implications.
And it is possible that those who believed in him [Christ] were mistaken,
and the whole faith is false, and God spoke falsely to those whom he
taught.27
On the face of it, this is an odd thing for one charged with winning
converts to admit. It seems at the very least counterproductive. Fur-
thermore, repeated emphasis of the radical contingency of all things is
hardly consoling for prospective converts. Faith would then yield no
less an uncertain destiny than the lack of it. What, then, was Holcot
attempting to say here, and why is he saying it? Allow me to hazard
a guess. Philosophy was a crucial tool for Holcot, a prolegomenon to
his preaching. Philosophical concern about prophecy, contingencies,
and the freedom of God shows the necessity—as philosophy cannot
itself do—of faith. Though philosophy cannot fully plumb the depths
of faith, its value lies precisely in recognizing its own limitations. This
is a fundamentally Thomistic insight.
Holcot's emphasis on faith represents his theological response to
the questions he raises in the quodlibets and Sentences-commentary
about the status of revelation. One of the main arguments he had
proposed against the contingency of revelation is this: If the resurrec-
tion of the dead is only contingently future, then all things would be
dependent on the free will of God. Yet, according to Augustine in De
cίvitate Dei 11.11-13, the principal function of beatitude is the security
of future beatitude. But what is contingent is able not to be; and what
is able not to be is in no way able to be demonstrated as existing with
certitude ("nequaquam esse certa ratione colligi potest")- Therefore,
the blessed could never possess the certainty—and, consequently, the
security—of their own future beatitude.28
Holcot responds to this argument by saying that the certitude
God effects in the blessed can never completely guarantee that it is
necessary that something (including their continued beatitude) will
exist. After all, revelation is contingent. But the certitude proper
27. Sentences, Streveler p. 8: "Et possible est omnis qui crediderunt in eum fuisse
deceptos, et totam fidem esse falsam, et Deum fefellise homines quos docuit."
28. Utrum generolis resurrecύo, Streveler lines 120-122 and 215-219.
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to the blessed is one possessed by faith, which causes a belief so
strong that it is as if (ac si) what is believed to be is not able to be
otherwise—even though it always is. I shall shortly return to consider
in more detail this ex si. It is a phrase that recurs in Holcot's writings.
For the moment it is enough to quote a passage from his quodlibet,
"Utrum, facta revelatione alicuius fίituri contingentis, ipsum maneat
contingens post revelationem."
I say that the certitude that God causes in the blessed is not such that
something will be so and impossible that it will not be so. Consider that
Linus knows that: "Linus will always be blessed.. . ." God is not able to
cause such certitude because it is impossible that God is such or is in
such a state that he is not able to destroy every creature; because he
freely conserves every creature just as he freely produced each one in the
beginning. But he causes in them such certitude that they will always be
blessed, and they cling to it so strongly and with such great assent, as if
it is not able to be otherwise. They know nonetheless that it is able to be
otherwise: because otherwise they would not know the condition of the
creature's being always dependent on God.29
Holcot affirms that even Christ knows that his beatitude could not
be continued, otherwise even he would be deceived if he believed
himself to be blessed of necessity ("alias enim foret decepta si sic
crederet se beatam quod necessario foret beata")- Nonetheless, Christ
does have the security that his beatitude will be freely continued.30
Holcot distinguishes two types of knowledge. First, there is the sort
of knowledge acquired at the conclusion of a demonstration or proof.
In this sense, even Christ does not and cannot know that there will
be a resurrection; because what is contingently able not to be cannot
be grasped by the type of certain reason arising from a rational demon-
stration. Second, knowledge can be construed as true estimation or
29. Utrum facta revelationβy Streveler lines 66-75: "[D]ico certitudo quam Deus
facit in beatis non est talis quod sic erit, et impossible est quin sic erit. Puta, quod
Linus sciat istam: 'Linus semper erit b e a t u s . . . . ' . . . talem certitudinem Deus non
potest causare, quia impossible est quod Deus sit talis vel in tali statu in quo non
posset destruere omnem creaturam, quia omnem creaturam acque libere conservat,
sicut libere a principio produxit. Sed causat in eis talem certitudinem quod semper
erunt beati, et illi adhaerent ita fortiter et tanto assensu, ac si aliter esse non posset.
Sciunt tamen quod aliter esse potest, quia aliter lateret eos conditio creaturae semper
dependentis a Deo."
30. Utrum generaUs resuπectio, Streveler lines 709-715.
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suspicion ("Alio modo accipitur scientia pro aestimatione vera vel
suspicione vera")- In this sense, Christ does have knowledge of the
future resurrection. Christ has such faith in a future resurrection that
it can be said to be called scientia ("igitur habet de hoc tantum
fidem, dicendum quod 'scientia' accipitur ad propositum").31 Still, this
knowledge is able to be made erroneous if God so wills ("tamen potest
fieri error, si Deus voluerit").32
How confident can the ordinary believer really be of the revealed
promises of God? Holcot wants to say that God fulfills God's promises
as if they would be fulfilled by necessity33 or as if they could not not
be fulfilled ("ac si non posset non impleri"34). "Nevertheless," writes
Holcot, "they will be fulfilled freely and contingently." So Holcot can
now interpret Luke 24:44 to mean that all things about Christ must
be fulfilled as if by necessity—and similarly for the other scriptural
passages cited previously.
There are no assurances, then, save the assurances of faith. Faith is
the key. In his commentaries on Wisdom and Ecclesiasticus, Holcot
tells a story in which he sounds very much like Pascal. He speaks of
a Dominican lay brother's efforts to convert a heretic, who persists
in disbelieving the immortality of the soul. Eventually the brother
points out to the heretic that in the absence of proof, it is better
to 'play safe'; for he would lose nothing by believing if his beliefs
were false and gain everything if they do prove true. The heretic was
converted.35
In his Wisdom-commentary, Holcot acknowledges the role of faith
in assuring the believer that God's promise of eternal life is true. It
is faith that provides the assurance that God does not speak falsely.
Though God can deceive, believers need not worry that God does
deceive. Holcot writes,
it is plain from divine truth that God deceives no one but promises eternal
life if we would do good and eternal punishment if evil; therefore it is so.
31. Utrum generate resuπectio, Streveler lines 616-617.
32. Utrum generalis resuπectio, Streveler lines 622-623.
33. Utrum generalis resuπectio, Streveler lines 543-544: "ac si necessario forent
implenda." Compare line 550.
34. Sentences, Streveler p. 123.
35. Super libros Sapientiae 15, Super Ecclesiasticum 19, as cited in Smalley, "Robert
Holcot," p. 85.
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And although it is perhaps not able to be proven by natural reason, as is
sufficiently apparent because of the weakness of the rational powers that
both saints and philosophers bring to this question; it is nonetheless very
appropriate to believe this—just as there are many other true things we
do not know how to prove.36
Holcot's position, then, seems to be this. There are certain things
that cannot be proven given their natures. These include the reality
of future resurrection and beatitude. Not even Christ could prove
these things, and not even God can cause certain belief in them.
These things can always not be. What can not be (which includes
all created reality) cannot be grasped by the type of certain reason
produced by demonstration. Other things do seem to be susceptible of
proof. These include the divine veracity and unwillingness to deceive.
Christ's faith in these things approaches a kind of scientia, according
to Holcot, though such knowledge forever eludes the natural capacity
of saints and philosophers.
What is contingently promised cannot be demonstrated. No analy-
sis of promises could uncover any necessity in their fulfillment. Rather,
a promise becomes a promise through the character of the one doing
the promising. Philosophy cannot validate the truthfulness of the
claims of faith. Still, by its proper display of the radical contingency
of all things, philosophy can show how specific future contingencies
can be true only if certain promises are kept. Believing in and on
those promises is faith.
Heiko Oberman has referred to the relation between faith and rea-
son in Holcot's work as "the riddle of Holcot's place in . . . medieval
history."37 Part of the reason for this riddle must rest with the diversity
of Holcot's literary corpus. Some of his writings are philosophically so-
phisticated. Others bespeak little or no concern with the technicalities
36. Super libros Sapientiae 15, from Oxford, Balliol College MS 27, fol. 26vb, as
quoted by Smalley, "Robert Holcot," p. 82: "[P]atet ex divίna veritate, quia Deus
nullum fallΐt, sed promisit nobis vitam eternam, si bene fecerimus, et penan eternam,
si male; ergo ίta fiet. Et licet non possit forsitan ratione naturali probari, sicut
satis patet per debilitatem rationum, que ad hoc tarn a sanctis quam a philosophis
adducuntur, summe tamen convenit hoc credere, sicut multa alia sunt vera, que
probare nescimus."
37. Heiko Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late
Medieval Nominalism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 236.
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and intricacies of philosophical issues or the philosophical methods
then current. Thus the moral and scriptural writings were intended
primarily to train preachers. They are not the appropriate place for
developing detailed philosophical argumentation. But if such differ-
ences in audience and purpose determine the balance of philosophical
subtleties and pastoral exigencies in Holcot's work, it is crucial to
note that these two are never completely separated. The Wisdom-
commentary, for example, contains several abbreviated statements of
certain positions expounded more meticulously in quodlibets or the
Sentences-commentary.38 Hence we have to be careful not to think
that we can neatly segregate Holcot's more speculative philosophical
agenda from his more practical, theological one.
There is also a converse influence, a linkage in the other direction.
There are among his 'philosophical' works traces of a pastoral program.
Holcot's concerns for prophecy and the contingency of revelation in
the quodlibets and Sentences -commentary become more prolegomena
than sophismata, laying the groundwork for what preachers must
preach and what the object of conversion must be: a reliance upon
divine promises as veridical. So it is that the concern with divine
promises in the philosophical work also undergirds Holcot's treatment
of grace in the Wisdom-commentary. According to Holcot, the be-
liever can be confident that God has established a particular order in
which certain acts are regarded as meritorious. "With God compulsory
necessity has no place, but an unfailing necessity is appropriate to God
because of his promise, that is, his covenant, or established law."39
God has promised or covenanted to put God's rewards—and hence
God's self—at the disposal of the free actions and initiative of God's
creatures. Holcot adduces scriptural warrant for this:
"Behold I stand at the door and knock. If anyone hears my voice and
opens the door, I will come in to him and eat with him" (Revelation
3:20). Therefore, when man disposes himself for grace by doing whatever
he can \faciendo id quod in se est] and thus opens himself, God necessarily
38. Smalley points out that even these abbreviated statements could have had a
tremendous impact given the extraordinary diffusion of Holcot's Wisdom commentary
("Robert Holcot," 85).
39. Super Ubros Sapientiae 12.145; quoted and translated in Oberman, Forerunners
of the Reformation, p. 149.
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comes in to him.. . . According to God's established law the pilgrim who
does whatever he can to dispose himself for grace always receives grace.40
I want to suggest, therefore, that the 'philosophical' Holcot of the
quodlibets and Sentences^commentary and the more 'theological' Hol-
cot of the Wisdom-commentary and pastorally oriented moral writings
are quite complementary. They are so complementary that an attempt
to focus on one apart from the other, or to try to separate philosophical
from theological agendas, results in an incomplete picture of Holcot's
enterprise. In the next part of this essay, I shall consider another
theological topic that particularly concerned Holcot but which, at
the same time, seems to depend rather heavily on the issues already
articulated relating to prophecy and the contingency of revelation.
THE MERIT OF FAITH
The same divine freedom that establishes the contin-
gency of revelation in one sense grounds it in another. Unlike Ock-
ham, for whom God's potentia absolute, seemed not to represent a real
power in God but an initial realm of possibility from which God chose
the existing order, Holcot seems to have thought that God even now
does occasionally act by absolute power to intervene in the established
40. Oberman, Forerunners of the Reformation, pp. 148-149. The expression "facere
quod in se est" (literally, "to do what is in one") was commonly used to describe men
and women's natural powers unaided by grace. For more on this aspect of Holcot's
thought, see Heiko Oberman, "Facientibus Quod in se est Deus non Denegat Gratiam:
Robert Holcot O.P. and the Beginnings of Luther's Theology," in The Reformation
in Medieval Perspective, ed. Steven E. Ozment (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971),
pp. 119-141. For the sense of the phrase in medieval theology more generally, see
Paul Vignaux, "On Luther and Ockham," in Reformation in Medieval Perspective, ed.
Ozment, pp. 107-118; Bengt Hagglund, "The Background of Luther's Doctrine of
Justification in Late Medieval Theology," Lutheran World 8 (1961): 24-46, at p. 40;
Francis Oakley, Omnipotence, Covenant and Order (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1984), p. 62; Heiko Oberman, "The Shape of Late Medieval Thought," in The Pursuit
of Holiness, ed. Oberman and Charles Trinkaus (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973), p. 15;
Oberman, Forerunners of the Reformation, pp. 129-131; and Oberman, The Harvest of
Medieval Theology, throughout.
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order.41 If Ockham and other contemporaries of Holcot distinguished
conceptually between God's absolute and ordained powers, they did
not think that God ever acts de potentia absoluta. Holcot disagreed.
With his reliance on God's promises to create a particular kind of
order, he needed to safeguard God's freedom and to protect God from
any necessitating circumstances, including God's own prior promises,
by invoking the real possibility of an exercise of absolute power.
For Holcot, one of the primary consequences of God's freedom is
God's ability through God's potentia absoluta to dispense with the
order of grace and supernatural virtues established and sustained by
God's potentia ordinata, which has chosen and maintained the present
plan of salvation, and to accept the natural, unaided acts of people
as meritorious for eternal life. Grace and the supernatural virtues are
not needed under some exercises of God's absolute power to confer
their goal, eternal life. Holcot writes that "God can accept all natural
acts of any person for eternal life" ("Deus potest acceptare ad vitam
eternam omnes actus naturales alicuius hominis") and that God can
accept a natural act as meritorious for salvation ("actus naturalis sit
meritorius si Deo placet").42 Human beings can in some way gain
grace through their own power, if only incompletely ("et sic aliquo
modo habemus gratiam in nostra potestate: videlicet dispositive et
incomplete: non tamen perfecte et effective").43
Actually, Holcot's views on merit contain some mixing of God's
absolute and ordained powers. People can merit from God's potentia
ordinata by obeying God's decrees, or God can accept their natural
41. Ockham discusses the distinction between potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata
in his Quodlibet 6 1 and Summa logicae 3(4)-6. For an excellent overview and anaylsis
of these categories, see William Courtenay, "The Dialectic of Omnipotence in the
High and Late Middle Ages," in Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval
Philosophy, ed. Tamar Rudavsky (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1985),
pp. 243-270. I have also benefited greatly from Paul Streveler's unpublished paper,
"God's Absolute and Ordained Power in the Thought of Robert Holcot." Streveler
writes (p. 7), "Holcot explicitly denies the presupposition that whatever God does He
does by His ordained power." Another unpublished paper by Streveler, "Robert Hol-
cot on Future Contingencies and Divine Omniscience," has also been very helpful.
42. Sentences 1.4.3H; quoted in Gordon Leff, Bradwardine and the Pelagians (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), p. 217, note 2.
43. Sentences 1.4.3K; quoted in Leff, Bradwardine, p. 218, note 4.
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actions by potentia absolutaM Nonetheless, this ability of God to
respond as God sees fit to the natural actions of people—God can
eternally damn someone existing in grace and give eternal life to a
mortal sinner45—has the consequence that someone can gain eternal
beatitude without true belief or, indeed, any belief at all Hence
the earlier problems that false belief caused for the contingency of
revelation lose their force for Holcot- Merit is not contingent upon
true or false belief but rather is grounded in following the will of God.
for man by willing to believe a particular proposition that he is com-
manded to believe—when it is false—is able to gain merit: nor does it
pertain to the merit of faith whether it is true or false.. . . That God
is able to command someone to believe some false thing is not to be
doubted.46
Again, to the case cited earlier of the Sadducee who was 'unjustly'
damned for believing what turned out to be true, Holcot responds, "I
concede that such a person in the case posited has been justly damned
not because he believed what is false but because he did not believe
as God commanded he believe."47
The issue of merit through false faith is closely related to the subject
of merit through what Holcot called 'invincible ignorance' ("ignoran-
tia invincibilis"); for both depend on the power and freedom of God to
confer eternal life upon whomsoever God wills.48 References to these
topics appear in Holcot's quodlibet questions, Sentences -commentary,
44. See Leff, Bradwardine, p. 220.
45. Sentences 1.4.3H; quoted in Leff, Bradwardine, p. 217, n. 2.
46. Sentences 1.1R, quoted in Leff, Bardwardine, p. 221, n. 3: "[H]omo enim
volendo credere certam propositionem quo precipitur esse credenda: et est falsa: potest
mereri: nee pertinet ad meritum fidei utrum sit vera an falsa.. . . Posse autem Deum
precipere aliquem falsum credi non est dubium."
47. Utrum generaUs resuπectio, Streveler lines 441-443: "[C]oncedo quod talis iuste
est dampnatus, non quia credidit falsum in illo casu posito, sed quia non crededit
sicut Deus praecepit quod crederet."
48. Holcot was certainly not alone in his interest in this question. Albert Lang
describes a pervading consciousness of an obligation for tolerance which in the first
half of the fourteenth century led to a great deal of scholarly speculation over the
question of implicit faith. See his Die Entfaltung des apologetischen Problems in der
Scholastik des Mitteblters (Freiburg i. Br.: Herder, 1962), pp. 193-194, n. 60, and
pp. 88-91.
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and Wisdom^commentary. For example, Holcot writes in Quodlibet 3,
"In fact, nevertheless, many receive merit in false faith and are ex-
cused through invincible ignorance together with the good will of
believing well."49 In his Sentences-commentary, he presents a more
sustained case.
if it suffices for an old lady to believe just as her prelate preaches to her,
and the prelate is a heretic, she, therefore, merits by believing heresy. Let
it be, therefore, that the old lady is killed for a heretical article that she
believes to be Catholic: either she is a martyr or not. If yes, an argument
against—she is not a witness of the truth; nor does she die for the faith; nor
for justice. Therefore, nothing makes her a martyr. If not, an argument
against.. . she intends to defend the faith and is invincibly ignorant.
Therefore, her intention is pure. Therefore, someone is able to merit
in false faith.. . . And thus it would be possible that someone is killed
as a martyr—this person being worthy of the prize of the martyr—and
nonetheless he believed the opposite of the articles of faith and merited
precisely because he believed the opposite of the articles of faith.50
According to Beumer, Holcot's ideas on invincible ignorance were
quite original and significant for the discussion that followed
49. Utrum generaUs resuπectio, Streveler lines 438-440: "De facto tamen multί
merentur in fide false et excusantur per ignorantiam invincibilem concomitantem
bonam voluntatem bene credendi." Thomas Aquinas speaks about invincible igno-
rance, though not in the context of merit. See his Summa theologiae 1-2.76.2-3 and
l-2.88.6.ad 2. In an unpublished paper on "The Reach of Grace Outside of Church,
Faith and Baptism in Thomas Aquinas's Theology," Thomas O'Meara writes, "The
issue, however, of salvation for those who had not heard of the Gospel did not attract
as much interest from the theologians of the thirteenth century as we might expect.
We do not find a disputation by Thomas, or a question or an article in the Summae
theologiae which consider directly other contemporary religious groups. Nevertheless,
there are about a dozen articles in the ST which touch on our topic obliquely. . ."
(p. 3).
50. Sentences 1.1.6 argum. princip. A; quoted in Beumer, Entfaltung des apobgetis-
chen Problems, p. 515: "[S]i sufficit vetule credere, sicut prelatus suus ei predicat, et
sit ita quod prelatus sit hereticus, ista ergo meretur credendo heresim. Ponatur ergo,
quod ilia vetula interficiatur pro articulo heretico quern putat esse catholicum: aut
est martyr vel non. Si sic, contra, not est testis veritatis nee moritur pro fide; nee pro
iustitia; ergo caret causa. Si non: contra . . . intendit defendere fidem et est ignorantia
invincibilis. Ergo intentio est integra; ergo aliquis mereri potest in fide falsa.. . . Et
sic esset possibilis quod aliquis efficeretur martyr, hoc est dignus premio martyrum,
et tamen crederet oppositum articuli et mereretur precise quia credidit oppositum
articuli fidei."
PROPHECY, CONTINGENCY, AND FREEDOM OF GOD 185
him.51 Here, Holcot describes the case of those who want to be saved,
but who do not know what to believe for their salvation.
Some, worried about obtaining salvation, want and desire to know what
are the means necessary for salvation. And since they understand that to
believe is necessary for salvation, they then desire to believe and want
to believe and have a prompt spirit for doing whatever is necessary for
salvation and, whosoever were such in whatsoever way, I believe that
they are saved in some way through divine grace.52
God's freedom and potentia absoluta enable God to accept natu-
ral, unaided human actions as meritorious for salvation. Holcot had
something like a personal stake in these issues, as his interest in them
joined with his strong classicizing tendencies, his proto-Humanist
studies and his interest in pagan antiquity that appear in clearest
focus in his scriptural and moral writings.53 He read widely in classical
literary works and became an assistant of the great book collector and
book lover, Bishop Richard de Bury. Holcot even corresponded with
Petrarch. How might these interests have carried over to his theology?
If one could be saved in false faith, one could certainly be saved just
as well without any faith at all. Holcot concedes as much: people are
able to merit without faith if it so pleases God ("potest dici quod sine
ftde posset homo mereri si deo placeret")-5^ This opened heaven up
for many whom Holcot read.
Holcot claims that even the pagan philosophers had knowledge and
belief in God for the following four reasons: First, they never denied
that God exists. Second, many of them believed in only one God.
Third, the philosophers accepted the fact that many since the origin of
51. Beumer, Entfaltung des apologetischen Problems, pp. 525-526.
52. Sentences 1.1.6K, quoted in Beumer, Entfaltung des apologetischen Problems,
p. 518: "[A]liqui solliciti de salute consequenda volunt et desiderant scire que sunt
media et ad salutem necessaria: et cum intellexerint, quod credere sit necessarium
ad salutem, tune desiderant credere et volunt credere et habent animum promptum
ad faciendum quidquid est necessarium ad salutem et, quicumque fuerent tales in
quacumque secta, credo eos per divinam gratiam aliquo modo salvados."
53. See Smalley, "Robert Holcot," especially pp. 5, 7, 65, 71. According to Smal-
ley, Holcot belonged to a group of fourteenth-century commentators on Scripture
who "hoped that their teaching and preaching would make more impression if they
presented it gracefully" (p. 5).
54. LJtrum theologia sit scientia (Muckle 127): "potest dici quod sine fide posset
homo mereri si deo placeret."
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the world worshipped God (like Adam, Noah, and others). Finally,
as Holcot writes in the third book of his Sentences-commentary, "I
say that of these philosophers or wise men of the world, certain of
them performed in a divine cult in compliance with some rites and
professions and were saved; just as is established of Job, Socrates,
Plato, Aristotle, and is able to be presumed of most bands of Stoics-"55
Holcot thus completes Thomas's baptizing Aristotle' by almost quite
literally baptizing him.
What is especially interesting about this topic of merit apart from
the true faith, I think, is how it draws together several different
motives in Holcot's writings. Is it possible that the issues about God's
power and the contingency of revelation were actually meant by
Holcot to clear some of the philosophical ground for the consideration
of this very practical and pastoral question about merit without faith
due to invincible ignorance? Such merit clearly seems to underscore
the contingency of revelation. Faith, Holcot recalls in De imputabilitate
peccatU is from hearing ("fides sit ex auditu," the classic text from
Hebrews). Those who grow up in a place where they are unable to
hear the articles of faith are in no way blameworthy ("ignorantia
illorum non foret imputabilis ad culpam"). Holcot concludes that
they can be saved regardless of their lack of explicit knowledge of
the articles of faith ("dico quod salvaretur non obstante ignorantia
fidei").56 Hearing the Word is therefore not necessary for salvation.
In fact, hearing the Word is a strikingly contingent event. It depends
on when one was born and the community in which one matured.
Holcot is very much aware of such contingencies and especially of
the role of the community in fostering faith. He writes,
I believe, however, that in modern times many Christians believe because
having been brought up among believers, they were accustomed from
55. Sentences 3.1.5RR-SS, as quoted in Beumer, Entfaltung des apologetischen Prob-
lems, p. 519: "Quarto, dico, quod de istis philosophis aut mundi sapientibus quidam in
divino cultu secundum aliquos ritus et protestationes prestiterunt et salvati sunt: sicut
constat de Job, de Socrate, Platone, Aristotele, et plurima turba stoicorum presumi
potest." Compare Oberman in Harvest of Medieval Theology, p. 245: "Holcot takes
I Tim. 2:4 quite seriously: 'God desires all men to be saved and to come to the
knowledge of the Truth.'"
56. De imputabilitate peccati 4BB; quoted in Beumer, Entfaltung des apologetischen
Problems, pp. 521-522.
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childhood to hear the articles that they ought to believe in. For they
began from infancy the honoring of God and fear of him; because they
saw that their progenitors and other true and honest men believed such
things.5?
Once Holcot dispensed with the requirement of proper belief for
salvation for particular philosophical and theological reasons, the way
to salvation was opened both for those living in Holcot's own time
who had never heard the Christian message proclaimed and for any
number of great figures from pagan antiquity who were now able to
join the company of the elect.
Obviously, as a Dominican, a member of the Order of Preachers,
Holcot was concerned with those in his own day who had not heard
the Gospel message. The issue would undoubtedly have been espe-
cially important for someone charged with the care of souls. But as
a preacher with classicizing tendencies and humanist sensibilities, he
must have been equally concerned with his teachers from classical
antiquity. As a philosopher and a Christian, he was confident that
God's power governed both groups and that God's mercy (an abun-
dant theme in the Wisdom-commentary)58 came to them equally.
In these ways, Holcot displayed a keen sensitivity to the contingen-
cies and historical limits of evangelization, a fact reinforced as more
and more was learned about communities that had yet to hear the
Gospel. More generally, Holcot's earlier concerns about the contin-
gency of revelation through prophecy may thus be said to complement
57. Sentences 1.1.6K, as quoted in Beumer, Entfaltung des apobgetischen Problems,
p. 518: "Puto autem quod modernis temporibus multi christiani idea credunt, quia
inter credentes educati articulos credendos a pueritia consueverunt audire, nomina-
tionem etiam Dei et eius timorem ab infantia conceperunt, quia suos progenitores et
alios veraces et honestos talia credere vident."
58. One thing that certainly does appear in his moral and scriptural writings
(whether as a consequence of his relaxation of philosophcial rigor or not, I do not
know) is a more personal conception of God than I have observed in the quodlibets or
SentenceS'Commentary. Again and again Holcot returns to the theme of God's mercy.
Thirteen of his Moralitates, a series of moralized exampla for the use of preachers, deal
with God's mercy and love for sinners. And in his Wisdom commentary, Holcot says
such things as, "it is declared how God rules all things: especially human nature by
mixing his power with his mercy" (Super Ubros Sapientiae lect. 142A); or that God
governs humans through mercy (lect. 144A), or that "God made all things through
his wisdom; he conserves all things through his goodness" (lect. 144A).
188 JOSEPH M. INCANDELA
these present concerns about the contingency of revelation through
evangelization. Both reveal a God of sovereign freedom. In both,
though in different ways, Holcot's philosophical sensibilities connect
with his pastoral sensitivities in a manner which is, as far as I can
tell, unique among his contemporaries.
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